I propose here a more radical and perhaps more depressing diagnosis of the sources of such disagreements: the burdens of judgment of Rawls and Hayek suggest that disagreements on matters of the utmost importance are often innocent. People who argue well in terms of evidence can come to radically different conclusions not only about political and political issues, but also about life forms that have ultimate value. Given their unique life history, people are rationally entitled to have very different views on complex issues. We can reasonably disagree on many issues, including a variety of policy issues and their underlying normative and empirical assumptions. Taking care of one`s own affairs, on this widespread representation of things, is a vice, not a virtue, and those who peacefully deal with disagreements are ipso facto imperfect in their commitment to justice. Restoring belief in the positive value of disagreement would indeed be a difficult task here. When Bernard Williams speaks of disagreements as « an important and constitutive feature of our relationships with others, » he speaks a moral language incomprehensible to those for whom freedom of expression is the last century and for whom history is always a story of moral progress. However, moral disagreement should not be prematurely described as insoluble; One of the most important ways to do this is to determine when our disagreements are reasonable. A free society should tolerate reasonable disagreements and draw strength from them, even if it rejects unreasonable disagreements. I suspect that if people followed this procedure during their moral, religious, and political disagreements on social media, where it`s particularly difficult to tell why people confirm what they say (given how little you know about them), we`d find that we significantly underestimate the frequency of reasonable disagreements.
But what is true online is true in most political conflicts. Each of us is in our own bubble of experiences and information, as well as those with which we disagree. If we do not break these cognitive barriers, it is difficult at best to understand the point of view of our adversaries. But the first thing we seem inclined to do is to contemptuously question their motivations, rationality, or intelligence. This is dangerous and unjustified. As I mentioned earlier, because of our cognitive biases and limited resources, it is difficult to identify reasonable disagreements as to why others take the positions they occupy. Therefore, we tend to believe that our political opponents hold the positions they take because of a culpable failure on their part – a failure to think or gather information, or a fundamental insensitivity to a fundamental moral imperative or value. But our cognitive limitations and biases will cause us to overestimate the frequency of inappropriate disagreements, so we should resist the temptation to judge others for their disagreement with us. Some disagreements may very well lead to disagreements about facts or, in some cases, principles. Other disagreements may take a different form. Sometimes people disagree in their attitude (Stevenson, 1972). They can tolerate chastity.
I cannot tolerate that. One might imagine, it seems, a situation in which we agree on the relevant facts about chastity, but disagree on the attitude towards it. It seems possible, for example, that two people disagree on the importance of respecting parents` decisions for their children without there being an obvious way to reach an agreement. Simple non-moral cases show this. If you like lima beans and I hate them, we might agree on the characteristics of a lima bean without ever being able to come to an agreement on whether we like it or not. In these cases, there is a dead end where there is no clear way to resolve it except to continue the conversation. By the age of 4, children understand that people may have conflicting beliefs about a variety of topics – empirical questions like the contents of a box, moral questions as if it is acceptable to fly, and questions of preference or opinion about the most beautiful color (Flavell, Mumme, Green, & Flavell, 1992). How do children interpret these different types of disagreements? It is conceivable that young children are absolutists who conceive of all these conflicts in the same way, namely as disagreements over the truth, so that one person knows the truth while the other does not. However, recent research shows that children appreciate that there are different types of disagreements.
Specifically, they are not absolutist in all areas. They understand that the status of a disagreement – whether it can be resolved and, if so, how it can be resolved – varies depending on the field of knowledge. Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam and Lewis (2004) asked 5-, 7- and 9-year-olds to consider disagreements between two people about four different types of problems: an empirical problem (p.B if a fallen pencil falls or falls), a moral problem (p.B. whether or not it is acceptable to break other children`s toys), a taste problem (for example. B, if chocolate ice cream tastes delicious or delicious) and an ambiguous causal problem (for example. B why a particular dog doesn`t eat). The children were asked if only one or both people could be right with their contradictory claims. In all three age groups, almost without exception, children reported that only one person could be right in case of empirical and moral disagreements. There was also great developmental stability in the way the children justified their absolutist beliefs for each of these two cases. All three age groups systematically referred to alleged factual truths in empirical disagreements (e.B. « What the girl says is false and what she says is just because pencils fall, of course, they never fall ») and deontic considerations in moral disagreements (e.g.
.B. « What he says is very wrong because it is nasty and unfair to break other people`s toys »). In an excellent recent article, Mollie Hemingway wrote, « We are slowly forgetting how not to love something without seeking its complete destruction. » I would only replace « slow » with « fast » – very fast. It makes me think of disagreements – what it is, what it means, what it`s for. So let`s explore. This essay explores the idea of reasonable disagreement and explains how to determine whether you have one or not. We believe that freedom/oppression, efficiency/waste, and ownership/theft are all good candidates for incorporation, and we are conducting further research on these topics, as well as honesty/deception to determine whether we should add any of them to the current list of five foundations. .